JAPAN'S SAVING RATE: NEW DATA AND REFLECTIONS
Introduction and Summary
There is a strong perception that the Japanese outsave Europeans and North Americans by a wide margin. I wish to make two points in this paper.
First, in the last one hundred years of Japanese economic history, the phenomenon of high saving is limited to the high growth era of the 1960s and early 70s. Second, the standard neoclassical growth model explains Japan's rapid post-war wealth accumulation reasonably well.
This first point, while possibly controversial, is what emerges from my examination of available data on Japan's aggregate saving in section 2.
For the post-war period, Japan's saving rate appears very high, especially compared to the U.S. However, much of the gap is a statistical illusion due to differences in the way national income statistics are compiled. If one calculates Japan's national saving rate as percent of NNP using the U.S.
definition that excludes government capital and values depreciation at replacement cost, the adjusted national saving rate for Japan gets much lower.
It shows a quite rapid decline after the 1970 peak of about 26%.
Newly available national accounts data for the period since 1955 indicate (after the depreciation adjustment) that Japan's national saving rate between 1955 and 1965 was nowhere near the 1970 peak. The national saving rate for the pre-war period was even lower than that. The long term economic statistics that cover the period between 1885 and 1940 indicate the prewar national saving rate was between 5% and 10%.
My claim that except for its large hump in the 1960s and early 1970s
Japan's saving rate is not extraordinarily high by international standards is fully reflected in Japan's national wealth over the last 100 years.
Japan's national wealth before World War II had a time trend with a growth rate of only about 3% per annum. Of course much of the wealth was destroyed during the war. The extent of wartime destruction is hard to estimate, but there is no question that the rapid wealth accumulation associated with the extraordinarily high national saving between 1965 and 1975 has put Japan's national wealth well above the pre-war trend line.
The analysis of the data in section 2 naturally leads one to ask the following two "big" questions about Japan's economic development over the last one hundred years. First, why was Japan's post-war wealth accumulation so rapid, especially between 1965 and 1975? Second, why didn't the rapid growth take place before the war?
Economics offers two competing explanations. The life-cycle hypothesis views the national economy as consisting of overlapping generations.
The alternative theory, the dynasty model, posits that each generation is linked to the next by altruism so that all generations act as if they form a single immortal dynasty. Section 3 examines cohort data to see which theory is closer to the truth. For the U.S. , recent empirical work seems to support the life-cycle hypothesis. The elderly in the U.S. hold typically very low assets with their consumption financed mainly by pension benefits.
The kind of inter-dependence between parents and their adult children that is predicted by the dynasty model cannot be found in available micro data on income and saving. For Japan, the dynasty model fares better.
The elderly do not seem to run down assets after retirement. Calendar time rather than age seems to be the dominant determinant of household saving.
Despite the rapid productivity growth, consumption by the old today is as high as consumption by the young whose lifetime income is several times that of the old today.
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Section 4 then utilizes the standard neoclassical growth model --a version of the dynasty model --to answer the two questions about Japan's economic development. The first question is relatively easy to deal with.
To converge to the equilibrium growth path from the low capital stock, Japan had to grow rapidly at some stage during the transition phase. It cannot be immediately after the war because people were too poor to save. It takes a number of years to set up the stage where the rapid growth can be sparked.
Recent work shows that it is in fact possible to construct a simple theoretical growth model that generates the hump-shaped saving rate. This answer makes the second question even harder. Why didn't the rapid growth take place before World War II? I do not have too much to say about this.
Perhaps it is the bad government. Japan's pre-war economic history is a history of the government taking up ever-larger share of resources. Very often, as too many less developed countries have witnessed, big governments are impediments to growth.
The last section, section 5, contains brief concluding remarks and conjectures about the future of Japan's economic development.
2, Kacro Evidence

Post-War Evidence
At first glance, Japan's postwar saving rate is extraordinary.
The national accounts data indicate that in 1987 Japan's national saving rate is more than 20% while the U.S. rate is below 5%. However, as I argued in Hayashi (1986 Hayashi ( , 1989 , much of the apparent gap is a statistical illusion.
Two of the most important differences in the way Japan and the U.S. compile their national income statistics are (1) depreciation accounting, and (2) fiLen.m. Torino.ati.
treatment of government capital formation.
It is perhaps useful to remember that saving as usually defined is net saving, which equals gross saving minus depreciation. Depreciation should be valued at replacement costs, that is, the correct measure of loss of value due to depreciation is how much it costs to replace worn out assets at current market prices. In the Japanese national accounts, depreciation is at book or acquisition value, which in an inflationary environment is much less than depreciation at replacement costs. This leads to a significant over-statement of net saving. According to my calculation, the discrepancy between depreciation at replacement costs and depreciation at book value on private depreciable assets is as much as several percent of GNP (it is about 5% of GNP for 1980). My procedure for estimating the replacement cost depreciation is merely to infer the Japanese government's estimate that is implicit in the national accounts, which include a section on balance sheets by sector at replacement costs. Briefly, I use the following procedure:
change in wealth -gross saving -depreciation at replacement costs + capital gains -residual losses.
The change in wealth, gross saving and capital gains can be calculated from the Japanese national accounts. I measure the replacement cost depreciation as gross saving plus capital gains minus the change in wealth, so that my measure includes residual losses, a component that should average out to zero over time.
The second important difference is that the U.S. national accounts fail to credit the government sector for its capital formation. All of government expenditures are treated as consumption, so that government saving in the U.S. national accounts simply equals a government budget surplus.
Japanese national accounts do include government capital formation as part of government saving.1
To make the saving rates from the two countries comparable, I calculated Japan's national saving rate according to the U.S. definition. This means that capital consumption adjustment and government capital formation are taken out from saving for Japan. In Hayashi (1986) the calculation was for the period l970-l98 only. Recently, the Japanese government has published the long-awaited estimate of national income accounts from 1955 to 1969. In Hayashi (1989) I expanded the calculation to cover the period 1955-1987. In 1979 the U.S. national saving rate was hiaher than Japan's.
Comparing Japan's adjusted rate with that of the U.S., we can make the following observations. First, the phenomenon of the extraordinarily high saving rate is limited to the ten year period of [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] culation.4 This is significantly smaller than the U.S. figure of 57%,5 mainly because the assumed depreciation rate for residential structures in Japan (made of paper and wood) is much higher (about 9%). If the depreciation rate for the depreciable assets of the household sector in Japan is constrained to be 4%, then the overall implicit depreciation falls to 7.5%.
Since the Japanese private capital-GNP ratio for 1987 is about 1.7, the GNP In 1987, the government sector started to run a surplus.
By the very nature of my estimation of replacement cost depreciation, which relies on the capital stock series in the Japanese national accounts, this depreciation rate of 9.8% must be very close to the depreciation rate implicit in the national income capital stock.
It is the ratio of depreciation in the U.S. national accoLnts to the stock of private capital stock (excluding consumer durables) in the Balance L Economy compiled by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. fraction of depreciation must then be about 17% (9.8% times 1.7). In other words, one has to subtract about 17% of GNP from gross saving to arrive at net saving for Japan.6 2.2. Pre-War Evidence My conclusion that the phenomenon of high Japanese saving rate is limited to the period of 1965-1975 is reinforced in a longer time span. For 1987 the value of land is more than two times the value of the capital stock, according to the Japanese national accounts. The value of land fluctuates over time wildly, thus obscuring our analysis. The exclusion of land in growth analysis can be justified with suitable separability assumptions. See Hayashi (1989) . is consistent with whatever scant evidence there is about the wartime destruction of the capital stock by Americans. Okita (1949) reports that about 25% of the capital stock was destroyed during World War II. If one 10 For the U.S., data on the capital stock are taken from Goldsmith (1956) . Since the population growth rate for the U.S. over this period is higher by 0.4 percentage points than that of Japan, the percapita growth rate of wealth is slightly higher for Japan than for the U.S. Figure 3 , the discrepancy between national weslth and the capital stock, which is net external assets, became substantial only very recently.
Two "Big" Questions
Another noteworthy feature of the post-war wealth accumulation in Figure   3 is that it appears to be tapering off; it appears as though the time path of wealth is converging to a new time trend, which I think is significant because it is happening precisely when Japan's per-capita GNP has caught up with that of the U.S. The U.S. , being the only developed country free from wartime destruction, has had at least a hundred years of uninterrupted wealth accumulation (with s relatively minor disruption during the Crest Depression).
It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the U.S. economy has been in a state of equilibrium. The view that the U.S. has been in equilibrium and Japan has been converging (on percapita basis) to that equilibrium from below is born out in Figure 4 where real CNP per capita is graphed for the two countries over the last 100 years. Here, I assume that filename: Torino.all percapita GNP is the same for Japan and the U.S. in 1987. A remarkable fact about the U.S. GNP is the pre-war and the post-war trends are the same, which is consistent with the view that the U.S. has been on the equilibrium path.
The Japanese pre-war trend is almost parallel to the U.S. trend; Japan's real percapita GNP before World War II was never more than 40% of that of U.S. for more than several years.
This prompts me to pose the following two closely connected questions about Japan's economic development over the last one hundred years.
(1) Why was the post-war wealth accumulation so rapid, particularly between 1965 and 1975?
(2) If Japan was able to reach the equilibrium growth path represented by the U.S., why didn't it take place before World War II? Why did Japan wait until after the war to decide to be rich?
These are "big" questions. I suppose that every economist seriously interested in Japan has his or her own answer.
Explaining Japanese economic development in a coherent and simple fashion is a challenge to economics.
Modern economics offers two competing theories of wealth accumulation. When analyzing micro data, it is very important to distinguish between the cross-section age profile of consumption, which is a point-in-time profile of consumption for cohorts of different ages, and the lonaitudinal age profile, which tracks consumption over the life-cycle of a given cohort.
It is the cross-section age profile of consumption where the predictions of the two theories of wealth accumulation differ sharply.
The life-cycle hypothesis predicts the well-known cohort effect in the cross-section profile of consumption: the slope of the profile must be less than the longitudinal age profile of consumption by the productivity growth rate of the economy. For example, if productivity grows at 5%, this year's, 30 year-olds are wealthier than last year's 30 year-olds (namely, this year's 31 year-olds) by 5%. Thus the level of consumption that this year's 30 year-olds expect for the next year is 5% higher than the level of consumption enjoyed by this year's 31 year-olds. Put differently, to obtain the longitudinal age profile of consumption, one needs to "tilt' counterclockwise the cross-section age profile by the productivity growth rate.
The prediction of the dynasty model is that there should be i cohort fil.n.ms: Torino.L1 effect in that the cross-section age profile of consumption should be independent of the productivity growth rate. This is because in the dynasty model all cohorts are altruistically linked, so that gains from productivity growth are shared by all cohorts of different ages.
To be sure, both theories predict the cross-section age profile of consumption to shift upwards as productivity increases. The difference in prediction arises when one compares the cross-section profiles for two economies growing at different rates. The life-cycle hypothesis predicts that the age-consumption profile in a slow-growing country should be more positively sloped than in a fast-growing country. That is, "in more rapidly growing countries the old are much lifetime-poorer than the young so consumption of the old will be much lower relative to consumption of the young than in slowly growing contrives." (Carroll and Summers (1989) ). The dynasty model predicts no such systematic relation.
3,2. Savins Rate
Perhaps the most well-known prediction of the life-cycle hypothesis is that the saving rate depends on age. More specifically, since households want the longitudinal profile of consumption to be smoother than the earnings profile, which is hump-shaped, the saving rate should be negative at both ends of the life-cycle. For the elderly, however, this prediction of negative saving rate should be modified if they have access to annuities, in which case (except for transactions purposes) their asset holdings should be zero with their consumption entirely financed by annuity benefits. If parents start transferring wealth to children after their retirement, then it may well be that their saving rate is positive while their wealth decumulates. In fact, Hayashi j._ (1988) found that this is the age profile of saving and wealth for Japan.
Transfers may arise under the life-cycle hypothesis, which makes its prediction not as clear-cut as commonly thought. For exsmple, suppose that it is difficult to purchase annuity contracts. A parent and a child may find it to their self interests --even if they are not altruistic to each other --to enter into a contract whereby the child would support the parent when old. The payment by the parent cannot be before the service is delivered by the child, because the child has every reason to renege the contract. The payment must be made after the service is delivered, namely when the parent dies, in the form of bequests. The child may even have to post a bond, in which case the parent would accumulate wealth toward death. The point here is that one has to be careful about the treatment of transfer income and payments. If transfers are excluded from income, the life-cycle hypothesis does predict negative or zero saving by the retired.
Measurement Problems. ConceDtual and Practical
Before turning to evidence, let me briefly discuss some measurement filsnas: Torino.ati.
issues, because I think that defining income, consumption and saving in a way consistent with national income accounts for each cohort (and for each household for that matter) from household surveys is an issue that deserves more attention. Imputed rent from owner occupied housing should be part of income and consumption, while depreciation on housing should be subtracted from income and saving. Employer contribution to social security and other pension plans should be included in income and hence in saving. Government transfers in kind should be included in income and consumption. This is important for Japan where education is heavily subsidized and where there is a large national medical insurance system. Household surveys typically lack information on some or all of these items, especially employer contributions and accrued government transfers, so that it is impossible to incorporate them for each household in the survey, but calculating those items for a typical household of a given age cohort should be feasible.
There is a more conceptual problem. Should capital gains be included in saving? They should be if households can "see through" the corporate veil so that dividends and capital gains due to retentions are just alternative forms of income. If one extends this argument further and assume that households can see through the government veil, changes in future tax liabilities should be deducted from saving: a tax cut of $1 raises disposable income and hence saving, but it also raises, other things equal, the present value of future tax liabilities which should be deducted from saving. It may be possible to calculate capital gains and losses on marketable assets for each cohort if data on assets and liabilities are available, but it is impossible (unless one makes very specific assumptions) to calculate for each cohort accruals of future tax liabilities.
fil.nam. ToEino.atl.
Evidence
For the U.S. evidence from household survey data seems broadly consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. The elderly in the 17.5. carry very low financial assets. According to Wise (1988) , the median net financial assets for couples aged 68 to 73 was only about $16,000 in 1979, and consumption is almost exclusively financed by social security benefits. This is precisely the prediction of the life-cycle hypothesis. However, as I argued above, it is also consistent with the dynasty model. A more decisive evidence against the dynasty model was provided by Altonji, Hayaahi and Kotlikoff (1989) who find that there is strong correlation between consumption and income within the family. If the dynasty model were true, the correlation should be zero.
The dynasty model fares better in Japanese data. Figure 5 One needs to exercise extra caution when one deals with Japanese cohort 11 Another source of discrepancy is that the National Survey covers only September, October and November.
Income and consumption are not seasonally adjusted. Also, singles are not included in the tabulation.
filenase: Torino.all data, for several reasons.12 First, no government household survey reports taxes paid by households other than the so-called "worker households"
(households whose head is on a payroll), which means that one can never observe from published reports the saving rate for the retired. The saving rate displayed in Figure 5 is for the worker households only; the saving rate for the 65+ age bracket is really for those who are still working after turning the age of 65, a pool of people hardly representative of the 65+ age cohort.
Second, extended families, which make up about a quarter of all households, are mixed with nuclear families in published tabulations by age. Despite all these caveats, the saving rate in Figure 5 seems to be inconsistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. First, it shows no systematic 12 For more details, see Hayashi .
(1988).
13 In extreme situations the true age dependence is conwetely masked due to this non-random cohort mixing.
Imagine that there are only two generations, young and old, and that the cross-section age profile of earnings is flat.
The young and the old living in the same household have an equal chance to be the head, that is, the main income earner. Suppose all households are extended families, so that household consumption is the sum of consumption by the two generations. Then it is easy to see that the cross-section profile of household consumption by the age of the head will be flat irrespective of the productivity growth rate. filenams: Torino.sll. dependence on age.
The cohort mixing would not completely maak che age dependence in the age tabulation. Second, this cross-section age profile of saving shifts up and down with the aggregate saving rate, meaning that macroeconomic events are much more important than age in determining individual saving. Put differently, the shifting age distribution --the important determinant of aggregate saving under the life-cycle hypothesis --has not been a major factor in the determination of aggregate saving in Japan.
Third, the temporal variation is greater for older cohorts. It is true that households in the 65+ age brackets in published tabulations are those whose head is still working, so that their positive saving is not necessarily inconsistent with the life-cycle hypothesis.
But, since their horizon is shorter than that of younger households, their saving rate should exhibit less volatility.
One really needs to have access to micro data to overcome the problems about Japanese data mentioned above. Age tabulations free from those problems were produced by Hayashi j,. 4j_ (1988) using the 1984 National Survey data tape14. Income tax and hence saving for all households (not just for worker households) are imputed, so that the retired can be brought into the age tabulations. Tabulation of the saving rate by age is done for nuclear households, so that the cohort mixing is eliminated. For extended families, the head is re-defined to be the younger generation (not necessarily earning more than their parents living together), so that the young in younger age brackets for extended families are representative of their own cohort. The definition of saving is strictly comparable to the national 14 All the calculation was done at Osaka University during the 1986/87 year when I was a faculty member there.
filenams: Torino.atl. income definition15. Figure 6 reports the resulting saving rate for nuclear and extended families. Now the saving rate is much more dependent on age than is indicated in Figure 5 , which is a testimony of the seriousness of the cohort mixing in published age tabulations. However, the evidence for negative saving for the old is very weak. There are two groups of old people: those maintaining an independent household, which are classified as old nuclear, and those living with their children.
For both groups, only those who are really old dissave. For the former group, that fact is clear from the saving rate for old nuclear families. For :he latter, their saving must be substantial because the saving rate for the extended families in the younger age brackets (where parents, whose adult children living with them are still young, are not very old) is higher than that for nuclear families in the same age bracket.
Thus, evidence about the saving rate is not favorable to the life-cycle hypothesis. What about the age-consumption profile? Figure 7 displays the cross-section age profile of consumption taken from published tabulations for the last six National Surveys.
Here, being derived from published tabulations, nuclear and extended families are mixed up, so the age profile is made flatter than it really is)6 But still, young people are more numerous than old people in younger age brackets and in older age brackets. For a fast-growing country like Japan, the age profile --albeit 15 Except that the government transfers in kind (education and medical care) are not included in income and consumption. This (unavoidable) omission, however, does not affect the level of saving. The saving rate is only slightly affected because income is slightly under-estimated. Also, transfer payments and income to and from members outside the household is not included in income.
contaminated by extended families in the published tabulations --should be tilted more in favor of the young, according to the life-cycle hypothesis.
However, as documented in Carroll and Summers (1989) would not explain why the profile is so much steeper than the profiles typically found for the U.S.
It is possible, however, to reconcile this last piece of evidence with the life-cycle hypothesis. The large-scale inter-generational redistribution of resources from the young to the old, which was brought about by the expansion of the social security system in the early l970s, may have allowed the current old to consume more than they could have afforded had there been no such expansion. An equally plausible explanation is that the current old, when young, did not anticipate the rapid economic growth that took place in the l960s and early 70s. Over their lifetime, they kept receiving more income than they anticipated, resulting in the old age asset holdings far larger than anticipated when young. It is this "excess" asset holdings that is financing the high old age consumption.
Explanation of Japanese Economic Develooment
To recapitulate: evidence from Japanese cohort data is consistent with the dynasty model. Is the dynasty model consistent with the aggregate evidence discussed in section 2? I now try to answer the two "big' questions about Japan's economic development I posed at the end of section 2.
The first question is relatively easy to deal with. If the U.S. economy is in a steady state equilibrium and if the only important difference between Japan and the U.S. immediately after the war is the huge disparity in the capital-labor ratio, then the standard neoclassical growth model --which is a specialization of the dynasty model with the standard neoclassical aggregate production function --predicts that Japan will eventually converge to the equilibrium path that the U.S. has been on. The idea is simple enough, but to fit the neoclassical growth model to the post-war Japanese data some modifications are needed. When the capital stock is low, the return from saving is unusually high because of diminishing returns to scale. Recent work by Christiano (1989) shows that it is indeed possible to modify the standard growth model to be consistent with the hump-shaped Japanese saving rate. Suppose that there is some subsistence level of consumption at which the marginal utility of consumption is very high and suppose Japan after the war was in that subsistence level. Then people would choose to consume rather than save even though the return from saving is extraordinarily high. People were too poor to save. But eventually, as the standard of living gradually improves, the high return from saving wins out, so that people start rapidly accumulating wealth. This is precisely what happened in the l960s. Christiano (1989) simulated the neoclassical growth model that has this subsistence feature to generate the hump-shaped saving rate. His model also predicts that the increase in the growth rate precedes the increase in the saving rate, another important feature of postwar Japanese economic growth noted by Romer (1986) .
This answer makes the second question even harder. Why didn't the rapid growth take place before World War II? I really have no satisfactory
answer. Perhaps it is the bad government. Japan's pre-war economic history is a history of the government taking up ever-larger share of GNP. This can be seen clearly in Figure 8 . Here, aggregate demand or total expenditure, which is GNP minus net exports, is broken down between private consumption, private investment and government expenditure (government consumption plus government investment).
It clearly shows the adverse impact on private expenditure of government war efforts, including the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, and the invasion of Manchuria followed by World War II.
As we all know, the resources taken up by the government did not bring about any benefits to the private sector. It is as if the aggregate production function had been shifted down. It also must have made the future too uncertain for the private sector to be tempted to save. It is perhaps not surprising that Japan's wealth accumulation did not take off until the bad government was removed.
Concludina Remarks
In this paper I have made two basic points. I hope by now I have convinced the reader of my first point --that phenomenon of extraordinarily high Japanese saving rate is limited to the period between 1965 and 1975.
As far as it goes, the second point --that the standard neoclassical growth economy has been on or close to the same time trend for at least a century does not necessarily mean that the same path is the equilibrium path (on percapita basis) for Japan. In fact, as I argued in section 3, the U.S.
wealth accumulation may well be consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis.
In both the overlapping generations economy inhabited by life-cycle consumers and the infinite-horizon neoclassical growth economy, the equilibrium growth rate is the rate of technical progress. The of the equilibrium growth path, however, may be different. It may be that the equilibrium path for the neoclassical model is parallel to the U.S. path but lies it.
If so, the prediction is that Japan will break away from the U.S. and other developed countries in terms of percapita GNP. The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both predictions. The next several years should be a very interesting period to students of the wealth of nations.
filenain.: torino.att Data Soura Figure 1 . Hayashi (1989) . (Table Al) , C? -"personal consumption expenditure" (Table Al) , CG -"general government consumption expenditure" (Table Al) , I -"gross domestic fixed-capital formation" (Table Al , A38), NI1LI -"gross domestic fixed capital formation excluding military" (Table A38 ).
Depreciation is "Provisions for the consumption of fixed capital" (Table A7 ).
The current account is calculated as "exports of goods and services and factor income received from abroad" ( Table  Al) less "imports of goods and services and factor income paid abroad" (Table Al) .
For the post-war period, the data source is Table Al and A2 of Hayashi (1986) and an update by the author. Table 4 -1 of Chapter 4 of It turned out that the latter was 1.1 times the former. I assume that the same factor of 1.1 applies to (net) capital stock. For 1950-55, I use the growth rate of the net capital stock is the same as that of the gross capital stock series from the the Hseries. The net capital stock series since 1955 and net external assets since 1955 are taken from the Japanese national accounts (Table 1- For the U.S. real GNP for 1885-1929 is taken from Balke and Gordon (1989) .
Real GNP since 1929 is taken from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
The population for 1885-1940 and 1950-1970 is taken from Table A53 of Ohkawa j,. j (1979) . The 1940-50 gap is filled by linear interpolation. Japan's population since 1970 and the U.S. population are from the census data. Figure 5 . The data for "worker households" on after-tax income and consumption are from the National Survey Reoorts (various years, hereaf.
ter ). After-tax income is pretax income less income tax less social security contributions.
The following published tables are used. For 1964 For , 1974 For , 197 and 1984 , the data are from published tables for all households excluding singles. This figure the three-way breakdown of total expenditure (CP+IP+IC+GP) between private consumption (CP), private investment (IP), and government current and capital expeneiditure (IG+CC).
For the pre-war period, the source for CP is listed above for Figure 1 . IP equals I above minus IC ("government gross domestic fixed-capital formation including military") which is taken from Table A38 of Ohkawa (1979) . G equals CC above plus IC. The data for the postwar period are from the Japanese national accounts (Tables I-I and 111-1 of Part 1). 
